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ABA SIL International Procurement Committee
Year in Review 2007
PAUL M. LALONDE, CHRISTOPHER YUKINs, DON WALLACE JR., JASON MATECHAK*

This year, the International Procurement Committee's YIR contribution is divided into
two sections. Section I reports on the important work being carried out on, among other
things, framework contracting and electronic procurement by Working Group I of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Section I deals
with the World Bank's continued campaign to eliminate corruption in procurement
through reform of the Bank's sanctions process, which complements its Voluntary Disclosure Program.
I. UNCITRAL Reform to Address Framework Contracting and Corruption
Issues Under Model Procurement Law
UNCITRAL Working Group I,1 which is developing reforms to the 1994 UNCITRAL
Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (UNCITRAL Model
* Paul M. Lalonde served as Editor of the Committee's 2007 YIR contribution. Mr. Lalonde is a partner
with the law firm of Heenan Blaikie LLP in Toronto and Co-chair of the firm's International Trade and
Competition Law Group. His practice focuses on government procurement and international trade law. He
is Co-chair of the ABA SIL International Procurement Committee, Vice-chair of the Canadian Bar
Association National Section on International Law, and Immediate Past-chair of the Ontario Bar Association
International Law Section.
Christopher Yukins and Don Wallace Jr. authored Section I on UNCITRAL developments. Professor
Yukins (cyukins@law.gwu.edu) is an Associate Professor of Government Contract Law at the George
Washington University Law School and Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program there.
Professor Wallace (wallace@ili.org) is chair of the International Law Institute, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center and of counsel to Morgan, Lewis & Boekius in Washington, D.C. Both
serve as advisors to the U.S. delegation to the UNCITRAL working group discussed below.
Jason P. Matechak authored Section 11 on the World Bank's VDP. Mr. Matechak is a partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of Reed Smith, LLP, where his practice includes public procurement and
international regulatory matters. He is a member of the bars of Virginia and the District of Columbia; a
member of the International Government Contractor Advisory Board, the International Advisory Board of
TRACE International, and the International Development Law Organization-USA; Vice-chair of the ABA
SIL International Procurement Committee; and a delegate to the U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law Working Group on Public Procurement.
1. Reports from Working Group I are available on the UNCITRAL website, at http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/commission/working-groups/lProcurement.html. The authors have written extensively on the
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Procurement Law),2 met in September 2007 in Vienna, Austria for its twelfth working
session. The working group made significant progress in its review of provisions regarding electronic procurement, including electronic reverse auctions.3
A.

ELECTRONIC PROCUREMENT

The working group has largely concluded its discussion of electronic procurement.
One of the main points of discussion has been electronic reverse auctions, which, while
common in the U.S. federal procurement system, are largely unregulated under the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law. 4 The discussion has centered on how and where
electronic reverse auctions should be used-specifically, whether it is appropriate for a
procuring agency to weigh non-price factors in an electronic reverse auction. Drawing on
the example of the European Commission's procurement directives, the working group
will likely recommend that, while the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law may accommodate non-price factors in an electronic reverse auction, any such non-price factors must
be accommodated with careful attention to the distortion they may cause in an auction
that is, after all, normally based solely on price.
Much of the next working group meeting, held in New York from April 7-11, 2008,5
was devoted to (1) framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems, and (2) the
Model Law's provisions regarding conflicts of interest in public procurement. The U.S.
delegation to the working group offered a paper on those topics, drawing on the U.S.
experience. The next sections draw upon and discuss the recommendations of the U.S.
6
paper.
progress of this UNCITRAL working group. See, e.g., Don Wallace, Jr., UNCITRAL: Reform of the Model
ProcurementLaw, 35 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 485 (2006); Christopher R. Yukins, Integrating Integrity and Procurement The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, 36 PUB.
CoNTr. L.J. 307 (2007); Christopher R. Yukins, A Case Study in Comparative ProcurementLaw: Assessing tUNCITRAL's Lessons for U.S. Procurement, 35 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 457 (2006); Jeffrey Marburg-Goodman, Jason
Matechak, Don Wallace, Jr. & Christopher R. Yukins, InternationalProcurement,40 INT'L LAW. 337 (2006)
(discussing 2005 UNCITRAL developments); Christopher R. Yukins & Laurence Folliot-Lalliot, Rivision de
la Loi Type sur les Marches Publics de la CNUDCI, 51 CONT. PUB. 36 (2006); Don Wallace, Jr. & Christopher
R. Yukins, UNCITRAL Considers Electronic Reverse Auctions, as Comparative Public Procurement Comes ofAge in
the United States, 4 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 183 (2005); DON WALLACE, JR., JASON P. MATECHAK & CHRISTOPHER R. YUINS, UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law: Reforming Electronic Procurement,Reverse Auctions, and
Framework Agreements, 40 PROC. LAW. 3 (2005); Don Wallace, Jr. & Christopher R. Yukins, UNCITRAL's
Model Procurement Law: Changes on the Horizon, 81 FED. CoN-'. REP. 323 (2004).
2. A copy of the 1994 UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law is available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/procurementinfrastructure/1994Model.html. A working copy of the proposed revised
text of the 1994 law, as of July 2007 (shortly before the September 2007 meeting of the working group) is
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/uncitralenglish/workinggroups/wgl/crp-xxxxx.pdf.
3. A report on the twelfth session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/640, is available on the UNCITRAL website, at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working-,groups/lProcurement.html.
4. See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, A Case Study in Comparative Procurement Law: Assessing UNCITRAL's
Lessons for U.S. Procurement,supra note 1.
5. See UNCITRAL Web Site, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.hnml.
6. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group I on Procurement, Revisions to the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services-Proposally the United States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
WG.IIWP.56 (June 15, 2007). The authors assisted in drafting the referenced paper from the United States
as advisors to the U.S. delegation to the working group. All of the working papers cited in this discussion are
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B. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS AND DYNAMIC PURCHASING SYSTEMS
7
At its meeting of May 21-25, 2007, at the U.N. headquarters in New York, the Working Group made an initial review of working papers that presented drafting materials for
the use of framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems in public procurement.
The working papers focused first on "framework agreements," which are defined by a
European procurement directive as any "agreement between one or more contracting authorities and one or more economic operators, the purpose of which is to establish the
terms governing contracts to be awarded during a given period, in particular with regard
to price and, where appropriate, the quantity envisaged." s
Framework agreements are very similar to Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity (ID/
IQ) contracts used by the U.S. government, 9 including the related Multiple Award Sched0
ules contracts principally sponsored by the U.S. General Services Administration.'
These contracts are sometimes called catalogue contracts in the United States, since typically a vendor will simply offer some part of its standard catalogue of goods or services to
the government at a discount. The catalogue of offered goods and services will then become a standing contract (a framework agreement, using the European term), against
which agencies may make specific orders for goods or services (contracts in the European
system). These types of contracts have been the subject of intense controversy and study
in the United States;" one purpose of the U.S. discussion paper, therefore, was to share
the fruits of that debate with the UNCITRAL working group.

1. Allowing for Multiple Framework Agreements
Based on experience in the United States, the U.S. paper first recommended that the
UNCITRAL working group ensure flexibility in any model law language regarding the
structure of framework agreements. An earlier UNCITRAL working paper contemplated
available at the online compendium of Working Group I's materials: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitralieni/
commission/working-.groups/lProcurement.html.
7. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group I on Procurement, Annotated ProvisionalAgenda
for the Eleventh Session of Working Group I (Procurement), U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.49 (Mar. 2,
2007).
8. Council Directive 2004/18/EC, art. 1(5), 2004 OJ. (L 134) 114-240, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
intemal-market/publicprocurement/legislation-en.htm.
9. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.504-16.505. A copy of the FAR is
available at www.acquisition.gov/far.
10. See id. § 8.4.
11. See, e.g., Acquisition Advisory Panel, Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the U.S. Congress, ch. 1-Commercial Practices, ch. 3-Interagency Contracting (Jan.
2007), available at http://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/finalaapreport.html. The Acquisition Advisory
Panel was a blue ribbon panel, tasked by Congress with recommending important changes to the U.S. procurement system. One working group within the Acquisition Advisory Panel-the Interagency Contracting
working group-compiled a long list of government reports on interagency contracting, including a large
number of reports highly critical of framework contracting in the U.S. government. That list is available at
2
2
http://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/documents/Sources%20for%2Olnteragency% OContracting% 0
Group.pdf. Because much framework contracting in the U.S. federal procurement system is done through
centralized purchasing agencies, debates in the United States surrounding framework contracting and centralized purchasing tend to overlap considerably.
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the award of a single framework agreement to multiple suppliers.' 2 This approach seemed
to draw from the European procurement directive. 13 The U.S. paper recommended that
the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law also allow procuring entities to enter into
multiple parallel framework agreements with multiple suppliers, rather than requiring
procuring entities to enter into only a single framework agreement with many suppliers.
Under this proposed approach, procuring entities would have the flexibility to enter into
multiple agreements with essentially parallel language.
The U.S. paper noted that this more flexible approach would likely enhance purchasing
entities' ability to achieve best value in procurement. Framework agreements are designed to allow procuring entities to launch mini-competitions among the subscribing
vendors, as requirements arise. 14 Forcing all the vendors to subscribe to a single master
agreement would mean less genuine competition in those mini-competitions, since vendors would be forced to conform to identical terms at the outset. This would heighten
concerns, similar to those raised by the European Commission approximately a decade
ago, that framework agreements may foster anti-competitive behavior in procurement.' 5
An alternative approach used in the United States favors multiple awards to multiple
vendors, under a single solicitation. 16 This approach yields multiple, nearly identical
master agreements with the various vendors but allows the procuring entity and the vendors to negotiate slightly different terms-such as different licensing terms-in each vendor's master agreement. These differences can increase the level of competition in
subsequent mini-competitions under the master agreements. The U.S. paper further
noted that the separate agreements also allow the procuring agency more flexibility should
it, for example, decide to terminate one agreement with one vendor because of concerns
regarding corruption or malfeasance.
2.

Closing the Divide Between Framework Agreements and Dynamic Purchasing Systems

The UNCITRAL working papers initially prepared for the working group 17 followed
the European procurement directives and created a conceptual divide between framework
agreements and dynamic purchasing systems.' 8 Indeed, one UNCITRAL working paper
12. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group I on Procurement, Possible Revisions to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services-Drafting Materialsfor the Use of
Framework Agreements and Dynamic Purchasing Systems in Public Procurement, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.I/
WP.52, T 10 (Mar. 13, 2007).
13. See Council Directive 2004/18/EC, supra note 8, art. 32, J 4.
14. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.52, supra note 12,
6.
15. See Press Release, European Commission, Public Procurement:Infringement ProceedingsAgainst the United
Kingdom, Austria, Germany and Portugal,IP/97/1178 (Dec. 19, 1997), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/97/1178&format=HTML&aged= 1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
16. See, e.g., FAR, supra note 9, § 16.504(c).
17. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.52, supra note 12; U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working
Group I on Procurement, Possible Revisions to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurementof Good, Construction
and Services-Drafting Materialsfor the Use of Framework Agreements and Dynamic Purchasing Systems in Public
Procurement-Addendum, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.52/Add.l, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working-groups/1 Procurement.html.
18. For example, the guidance on dynamic purchasing systems published by one prominent centralized
purchasing agency, the U.K. Office of Government Commerce, plainly indicates that dynamic purchasing
systems are not erected using framework agreements. See U.K. Office of Government Commerce, Dynamic
Purchasing Systems: OGC Guidance on Dynamic Purchasing Systems in the New Procurement Regulations (Jan.
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explicitly cited the European procurement directive's definition of dynamic purchasing
systems as follows:
A "dynamic purchasing system" is a completely electronic process for making commonly used purchases, the characteristics of which, as generally available on the market, meet the requirements of the contracting authority, which is limited in duration
and open throughout its validity to any economic operator which satisfies the selection criteria and has submitted an indicative tender that complies with the
specifications.19
The experience of the U.S.'s federal procurement system, however, has been that
framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems (at least as contemplated by the
Model Law) are not distinct, but rather that dynamic purchasing systems are merely a
logical extension of framework agreements.
A practical example may help illustrate the U.S. experience. For many decades, the
U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) (a centralized purchasing agency) has sponsored Multiple Award Schedules contracts. 20 These are essentially framework agreements,
which may be entered into at any time by any qualified vendor interested in selling the
subject goods or services to the U.S. government. 21 There are many different classes of
these standing agreements, such as classes of contracts for information technology or for
management services. The GSA Multiple Award Schedules contracts give U.S. agencies
ready access to thousands of vendors and literally millions of commercial goods and
services.
To enter into a Multiple Award Schedules contract with the GSA, a vendor may at any
time prepare and submit a proposal against a standing GSA solicitation. The GSA contracting officer then works to negotiate an agreement with the vendor for the proffered
goods and services.2 2 The terms of that agreement are generally based on the vendor's
commercial sales practices; typically, the GSA Multiple Award Schedules contract is ultimately based upon a discount against the vendor's commercial prices, and incorporates at
least some of the vendor's standard commercial terms.
The vendor's Multiple Award Schedules agreement with the GSA may be one of hundreds, if not thousands, of other such GSA agreements in the same industry. There are,
for example, thousands of information technology vendors that hold GSA Multiple Award
Schedules contracts for hardware, software, and information technology services. This
rich field of potential vendors allows buying agencies to launch robust mini-competitions
2006), available at http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Guidedynamic-purchasing.pdf. See also Sue Arrowsmith, Implementation of the New EC Procurenent Directives and the Alcatel Ruling in England and Wales and
Northern Ireland: A Review of the New Legislation and Guidance, 2006 PuB. PROC. L. REv. 86, 114 (comparing
dynamic purchasing systems and framework agreements); Sue Arrowsmith, Dynamic PurchasingSystems Under
the New EC ProcurementDirectives-A Not So Dynamic Concept?, 2006 PuB. PROC. L. REv. 16, 28 [hereinafter
Dynamic PurchasingSystems](comparing formation of dynamic purchasing systems and formation of framework agreements).
19. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.52/Add.1, supra note 17, 1 7.
20. See, e.g., Marc F. Efron, Terry L. Albertson & Nabil W. Istafanous, The GSA Multiple Award Schedule
Program, BRIEFING PAPERS, Oct. 1994, at 94-11.
21. Information on the GSA Multiple Award Schedules contracts is available at the GSA website, www.gsa.
gov (follow the "GSA Schedules" hyperlink).
22. See FAR, supra note 9, § 8.4.
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amongst many eligible vendors-the eligible Multiple Award Schedules contract holders-when requirements later arise. As with the dynamic purchasing systems contemplated by the European procurement directive, these mini-competitions may be held
through an electronic marketplace. There is no requirement in the U.S. system, however,
that the system be fully electronic.
As this example illustrates, the U.S. experience is that a dynamic purchasing system can
23
perhaps best be understood as a unique form of framework agreement-a third model,
under which vendors may join an always open standing system of agreements. While this
approach would require some tweaking of the European model, this conceptual approach
offers a smooth continuum from frameworks to dynamic purchasing systems.
There are advantages and disadvantages to this approach. Among other things, this
"always open" model allows vendors to join existing framework agreements as market
conditions and technologies evolve. As a result, there is less chance that framework agreements would protect locked sets of incumbent vendors, and agencies would be more likely
to have easy access to new vendors and new technologies. On the other hand, this "always
open" approach means that vendors, when initially entering into such agreements, would
probably not be competing directly against other vendors, and thus would feel less acute
competitive pressures to offer the government favorable prices and terms. To protect
against this, the law would have to ensure that the mini-competitions subsequently held
among vendors are indeed robust.
As a drafting matter, many of these concerns were addressed by the UNCITRAL working papers reviewed at the session in New York in April 2008. Those working papers
propose provisions to ensure that procuring entities use careful procedures for entering
into, and implementing, dynamic purchasing systems. 24 The U.S. recommendation,
therefore, went mainly to the conceptual structure of the proposed revisions. Instead of
dealing with dynamic purchasing systems as a distinct concept, the U.S. delegation recommended that the UNCITRAL working group treat such systems as another model for
framework agreements, perhaps renamed dynamic framework agreements.
The approach recommended by the U.S. delegation-melding framework agreements
and dynamic purchasing systems under the UNCITRAL model law-would have two
apparent benefits. First, this approach would seem to clarify the intent behind these
unique agreements, and might well make dynamic purchasing systems more attractive to
procuring agencies. 25 Second, by making it simpler to amass dynamic framework agreements that are fully electronic and fully accessible from geographically dispersed points,
the suggested approach could make it simpler to centralize standardized purchasing-and
thus allow widely dispersed purchasing agencies, potentially from several governments, to
buy commodities from a single source. The practical experience in the United States has
been that this highly centralized approach (called cooperative purchasing, when, for exam-

23. Model 1 framework agreements (with fixed terms for purchase orders) and Model 2 framework agreements (which allow for mini-competitions among vendors under the agreement) are described in U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.L/WP.52, supra note 12, 6.
24. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.52/Add.I, supra note 17.
25. Dynamic purchasing systems have not, it seems, until now been met with great enthusiasm in the
European procurement community. See, e.g., Dynamic PurchasingSystems, supra note 18, at 28.
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ple, a state government makes a purchase under a federal contract) offers important new
26
efficiencies for governments and their vendors.
C.

ANTI-CoRRUPT7ON MEASURES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PROCUREMENT

In previous sessions, the UNCITRAL working group agreed to add the issue of conflicts of interest to the list of topics to be considered in the ongoing revision of the Model
Law. 2 7 In this regard, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Convention),
which entered into force in December 2005,28 specifically calls for anti-corruption measures in procurement to address conflicts of interest. The Convention calls, in relevant
part, for "measures to regulate matters regarding personnel responsible for procurement,
such as declaration of interest in particular public procurements, screening procedures and
29
In light of the Convention's language, the U.S. delegation to
training requirements."
the UNICTRAL working group recommended that the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law include such conflict-of-interest provisions, so that nations implementing the
Model Law have, included in their procurement systems, provisions in place in accord
30
with the Convention.
26. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Swisher, Expanded Use of GSA Schedules by State and Local Governments, 42 PROC.
LAW. 20 (2007).

27. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.49, supra note 7, J 8, 64.
28. Information on the UN Convention Against Corruption is available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
crime-conventioncorruption.html. For a broader discussion of how the UN Convention Against Corruption might be accommodated by the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, see Christopher R. Yukins,
Integrating Integrity and Procurement: The United Nations Convention Against Corruptionand the UNCITRAL
Model Procurement Law, 36 PUB. CON-T. LJ. 307 (2007).
29. Article 9, paragraph 1, of the UN Convention Against Corruption reads, in total, as follows:
Article 9
Public procurement and management of public finances
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, take
the necessary steps to establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-making, that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption. Such systems, which may take into account appropriate threshold values in their
application, shall address, inter alia:
(a) The public distribution of information relating to procurement procedures and contracts,
including information on invitations to tender and relevant or pertinent information on the
award of contracts, allowing potential tenderers sufficient time to prepare and submit their
tenders;
(b) The establishment, in advance, of conditions for participation, including selection and
award criteria and tendering rules, and their publication;
(c) The use of objective and predetermined criteria for public procurement decisions, in order
to facilitate the subsequent verification of the correct application of the rules or procedures;
(d) An effective system of domestic review, including an effective system of appeal, to ensure
legal recourse and remedies in the event that the rules or procedures established pursuant to
this paragraph are not followed;
(e) Where appropriate, measures to regulate matters regarding personnel responsible for procurement, such as declaration of interest in particular public procurements, screening procedures and training requirements.
30. Nations adopting the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law may have joined the UN Convention
Against Corruption already. For a list of nations that have signed, and then ratified, accepted, approved of,
acceded to, or succeeded to the Convention, see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crimesignatures_corruption.
html.
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A great deal of work relating to conflicts of interest in procurement has been done
internationally, including studies done by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD),31 and the United Nations' own Standards of Conduct for the
International Civil Service, which specifically highlight the dangers of conflicts of interest
in procurement. 32 The United States has developed an extensive body of law regarding
conflicts of interest in procurement, and work continues in expanding and improving this
area of law. 33 The U.S. experience should, therefore, prove useful, as the UNCITRAL
working group moves forward to integrate the principles of the Convention as part of the
broader effort to update and reform the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law.
D.

CONCLUSION

The initiative to reform the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law is entering its
fourth year. When the UNCITRAL working group convened in New York in April 2008,
the working group addressed framework agreements, dynamic purchasing systems, and at
least initially the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Because the U.S. federal procurement system has such a rich history in many of these areas, it is hoped that the U.S.
experience will prove useful to the working group in its ongoing deliberations.
H. Combating Corruption in World Bank Procurement: Voluntary
Disclosure Program and Sanctions Reform
Following in the wake of last year's announcement of the initiation of a new Voluntary
Disclosure Program (VDP), the World Bank Group continues to battle the cancer of corruption in World Bank programs and procurements through the unveiling of a new sanctions process. These sanctions reforms add a bigger stick to complement the carrot of the
VDP. This section will summarize the VDP and provide an overview of the World Bank's
new sanctions regime.
A.

THE CARRT-VDP

The VDP is-as its name connotes-a voluntary program whereby World Bank contractors can come clean on past improprieties. 34 Specifically, the VDP-as implemented
by World Bank's Department of Institutional Integrity (INT)35-provides a framework
whereby World Bank contractors can (1) cease corrupt practices and commit to not engage in misconduct in the future; (2) disclose to the Bank the results of an internal investigation into past fraudulent, corrupt, collusive, or coercive acts in Bank-financed or
31. Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), OECD Guidelines for Managing
Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: Report on Implementation (uly 11, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.
org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34135--_1-1-1,00.html.
32. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Standards of Conductfor the International Civil Service, 22, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001497/149745e.pdf.
33. See, e.g., Keith R. Szeliga, Watch Your Step: A Contractor'sGuide to Revolving-Door Restrictions, 36 PUB.
CoNT. LJ. 519 (2007).
34. See generally The World Bank, Voluntary Disclosure Program, http://www.worldbank.org/vdp.
35. Additional information on the World Bank's Department of Institutional Integrity is available at http://
www.worldbank.org/integrity.
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supported projects or contracts; and (3) implement a robust "best practices" internal com36
pliance program monitored by a Bank-approved third-party for three years. Through
the VDP, World Bank contractors can avoid debarment and publicity problems and may
37
continue to compete for and participate in World Bank-supported projects.
In order to enter the VDP, interested contractors need only complete a standard background data sheet. 38 Within thirty days, INT confirms contractor eligibility by making
sure that the contractor is not already under active investigation by the World Bank and
39
invites the contractor to accept the VDP's standard terms and conditions. Upon acceptance of these terms and conditions, which generally cannot be negotiated or modified, the
contractor is required to undertake an internal investigation and disclose any sanctionable
activity in accordance with a World Bank-approved Internal Investigation and Report
Protocol.40 Upon completion of the internal investigation and submission of the investigative report, the World Bank will verify the report and institute a regime of compliance
improvements and monitoring. 4i Within three years, participating contractors are ex42
pected to complete the VDP.
While the VDP may be an appropriate course of action for some World Bank contractors, it is important to note that the VDP only applies to disclosed past problems and that
other issues discovered during the course of the program can lead to debarment. Further,
the VDP's confidentiality provisions should not be considered an amnesty from local or
international enforcement. 43 Specifically, while the World Bank may choose not to debar
a VDP participant and keep the proceedings confidential, there is nothing in the VDP's
purview that would prevent a separate enforcement action brought by national authorities.
Likewise, the VDP does not offer a witness protection program or have the capacity to
protect VDP participants.
B.

THE STICK-SANCTIONS REFORM

Along with the institution of the VDP, the World Bank has reformed its sanctions program. These reforms include structural reforms and the addition of a broader array of
sanctions beyond simple debarment. Structurally, the sanctions program has been reconstituted into a two tier regime. At the first tier, INT and other World Bank staff investigate allegations of sanctionable misconduct.44 Upon sufficient evidence, INT refers the
case to the Sanctions Evaluation and Suspension Officer (Officer). If a preponderance of
the evidence supports a finding of sanctionable activity, the Officer issues a Notice of
36. See The World Bank, Department of Institutional Integrity, Voluntary Disclosure Program, VDP
Guidelines for Participants, § 3 (July 20, 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTVOLDIS
PRO/Resources/VDPGuidelinesforParticipants.pdf.
37. See id.
38. See id. § 5.2.3.
39. See id. § 5.3.
40. See id. § 5.5.
41. See id. § 5.6.
42. See id.
43. See id. § 6.
44. See The World Bank, Sanctions Management, Office of Evaluation and Suspension, Overview-Tackling
Corruption Through a Two-Tier Sanctions Management Process, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/O,,contentMDK:21419040menuPIK 3601079-pagePK64168445-piPK-64168309-theSitePK: 3601046,00.html.
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Sanctions Proceedings and offers a proposed sanction.45 The Officer also has the authority to suspend the offending party from bidding on future World Bank financed contracts.
Challenges to the Officer's determinations may be raised to the second tier Sanctions
Board.46 The Sanctions Board, which is a reconstituted version of the prior Sanctions
Committee level bolstered by non-World Bank staff, has the final say in sanctions decision-making.
By way of sanctions options, in addition to straight debarment, the sanction reforms
now include a number of other possibilities. First, public letters of reprimand are part of
the sanctions program's "name and shame" capability.47 Second, conditional non-debarment allows a contractor to continue to participate in World Bank funded projects so long
as conditions similar to those of the VDP are met.48 Third, debarment with conditional
release results in a debarment that can be shortened subject to the achievement of certain
50
benchmarks.4 9 Finally, restitution is now available as a tool of sanctions enforcement.
The combination of the VDP and Sanctions reform has placed the World Bank in a
much better position to police corruption in World Bank funded procurements.

45. See id.
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